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INTRODUCTION
As economic and trade policies continue to affect more facets of soci-
ety, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) impact on government policy
and citizens’ lives has grown. Since its creation on January 1, 1995, the
WTO has fostered trade liberalization negotiations and served as a forum
where member countries can discuss economic concerns with one an-
other.1 The WTO is perhaps best known for its dispute settlement mecha-
nism.2 When countries cannot reach a mutual resolution to a conflict
* “A censor is a man who knows more than he thinks you ought to.”
- Granville Hicks
1. Understanding the WTO: What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited July 21,
2013).
2. News headlines and public attention mainly focus on the relatively few issues that
are submitted to a WTO panel for judgment. Most disputes, however, are settled without the
use of formal legal proceedings or never even rise to the point of discussion. See Understand-
ing the WTO: A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/the
wto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2013) (“[T]he point is not to pass
857
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governed by a trade agreement, they can initiate formal legal proceedings
against one another by asking for a panel to be appointed.3 The panel then
hears the complaint and issues a ruling, which may be appealed by either
of the parties on legal grounds.4 The ruling simply identifies which, if any,
WTO obligations are being breached, but does not impose punishment.5 If
the losing country does not move to conform to its WTO obligations, the
other member country may request permission from the Dispute Settle-
ment Body to impose trade sanctions, which must be granted within thirty
days unless a consensus of member countries disagrees.6
The current dispute settlement mechanisms were created as a part of
the WTO through the Uruguay Round of negotiations.7 The agreement
was signed by the 123 governments that served as the first members of the
WTO.8 Countries subsequently looking to attain WTO membership must
formally accede to the scheme.9 The accession process is time consuming
and requires, among other things, the applicant to make a formal applica-
tion, negotiate bilateral terms individually with every interested WTO
member, and adopt all of the WTO multilateral trade agreements.10
judgement. The priority is to settle disputes, through consultations if possible. By January
2008, only about 136 of the nearly 369 cases had reached the full panel process. Most of the
rest have either been notified as settled ‘out of court’ or remain in a prolonged consultation
phase—some since 1995.”).
3. A member country may request the appointment of a panel after it has exhausted
the mandatory sixty-day consultation period with the country whose policies are at issue. Id.
The defending country can block the appointment of a panel for whatever reason it sees fit,
but this can only be done once without a Dispute Settlement Body consensus. Id.
4. Id. The process is simplified for the purposes of this Note. In actuality, the panel
issues an interim decision for the parties to comment on and the Dispute Settlement Body
chooses to adopt the panel’s report. Id. The panel’s report is automatically adopted by the
Dispute Settlement Body after sixty days unless a consensus to the contrary arises among the
WTO members. Id. It is extremely unlikely that a consensus not to adopt the resolution will
take place given that the Dispute Settlement Body is composed of all the WTO member
governments and the winning party is unlikely to change its mind. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. This process is also simplified for the purposes of this Note. In practice, the
losing party must enter into negotiations with the prevailing party to find an agreement on
compensation. Id. Such compensation can come in the form of removing the illegal practices,
reducing restrictions on an area of interest to the prevailing party, or monetary payments. See
id.
7. Understanding the WTO: The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www
.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2013).
8. Id.
9. Understanding the WTO—membership, alliances, and bureaucracy, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm (last visited July 21,
2013).
10. The process has been summarized. In greater detail, the process starts when a
country files a formal written request for accession. Id. A Working Party is then created,
consisting of any interested WTO members, to examine the applicant and make recommen-
dations. Id. Bilateral negotiations must take place between the applicant and any interested
Working Party members. Id. The Working Party establishes the final terms of accession and
presents it to the General Council or Ministerial Conference. A two-thirds majority vote of
the WTO membership is required to approve the accession. Id. If a country has not already
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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) acceded to the WTO in 2001,
following its successful trade negotiations with WTO members, principally
the United States.11 As part of its accession, the PRC government was also
required to adopt the WTO’s multilateral trade agreements, including the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).12 All three agreements require the PRC to im-
plement domestic laws and regulations in conformity with the agreements.
To the ire of many U.S. corporations and under criticism from Western
media, however, the PRC has continued a policy of Internet censorship.13
The PRC’s censorship regime is estimated to cost U.S. businesses billions
of dollars in lost revenue a year.14 The most high profile situations involve
Google and Facebook, each of which receives varying degrees of censor-
ship by the PRC government.15 As the growing “information age” capital
of the world, the United States will likely seek to protect the Internet gi-
ants that are so central to its economic future and its best chance at doing
so is through the WTO.
translated its WTO requirements into domestic law, it must ratify the final terms of accession
to complete the process. Id.; see also Accession: How to become a member of the WTO,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited
July 21, 2013) (“Terms and conditions include commitments to observe WTO rules and disci-
plines upon accession . . . “).
11. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20139, CHINA AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 2–3 (2001); Understanding the WTO: Members and Observ-
ers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
(last visited July 21, 2013).
12. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 11, at 2. The most important features of R
GATT and GATS are “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment,” which disallows members from
discriminating between member countries in lowering import restrictions, and the National
Treatment provision, which disallows a member from discriminating between domestic and
imported goods and services once they are inside the country. General Agreement on Trade
and Services arts. II, 17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, 1896 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS]; General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. I–III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A–11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. The two agreements also contain concession schedules, wherein mem-
bers detail their treatment of important goods and services. GATS art. XX; GATT art. II.
TRIPS lays out minimum intellectual property right protections and enforcement provisions.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
13. John Poirier, Google Helps Build Trade Case Over Web Censorship, REUTERS
(June 11, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/11/us-google-trade-idUSTRE65A6A
D20100611?type=technologyNews&feedType=RSS&feedName=technologyNews&utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+reuters%2Ftechnology
News+(News+%2F+US+%2F+Technology)&utm_content=Google+Reader.
14. China’s Censorship of the Internet and Social Media: The Human Toll and Trade
Impact: Hearing Before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 112th Cong. 15
(2012) (statement of Gilbert B. Kaplan, President, Committee to Support U.S. Trade Laws),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72895/html/CHRG-112hhrg72895
.htm.
15. Id. at 14.
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This Article details the dual-track approach that the United States
could adopt in a WTO case against the PRC’s censorship regime on behalf
of Google and Facebook. First, this Note details the current situation and
tracks the recent developments regarding Google and Facebook in the
PRC. Second, the intricacies of the PRC market are examined by analyz-
ing the relevant domestic legal issues and local PRC practices, both of
which affect Google and Facebook’s operations. Third, by utilizing the
PRC’s GATS schedule and pertinent WTO law, this Note concludes that
the PRC’s censorship policies are incompatible with its WTO obligations.
Concurrently, an examination of the present situation will reveal that the
United States could also pursue a TRIPS claim against the PRC govern-
ment for its strict censorship regime. While the United States will likely
prove successful in its legal arguments against the PRC, such a success is
unlikely to mark the end of the trade dispute. Instead, the United States
will almost assuredly need to engage in a complex series of legal maneu-
vers to enforce a positive judgment as current WTO law normally requires
retaliatory measures to be taken in the same sector of trade as the viola-
tion complained of.16 Thus, while the road ahead for a U.S. claim against
Chinese censorship may be a long one, it could ultimately be a successful
one for the U.S. economy.
I. PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
This Note focuses on the most publicized instances of censorship in
the PRC, namely that of California-based Google and Facebook.17 The
discussion of Google will focus on its most popular products, including its
search engine, GMail, and YouTube. This Note will then focus on
Facebook’s social networking services. A brief history of both companies’
involvement and legal presence in the PRC market will be discussed to
provide background and context. Subsequently, the widely-publicized pre-
sent state of affairs and circumstances regarding Google and Facebook in
China will be detailed to show how dramatically these corporations and, in
turn, the U.S. economy, have been affected by the PRC’s practices.
Google was founded in 1998 to serve as a strong competitor to Yahoo
and other search engines.18 From early 2000 to the fall of 2002, Google
experienced almost no obstacles to providing its services to the Chinese
market, and it was estimated that the Chinese language version of Google
16. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes art. 22, cl. 3(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
17. FB Company Profile, MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/
stock/FB/profile (last visited July 21, 2013); GOOG Company Profile, MARKETWATCH, http:/
/www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/GOOG/profile (last visited July 21, 2013) .
18. GOOG Company Profile, supra note 17; Scott Rosenberg, Let’s Get This Straight: R
Yes, There is a Better Search Engine, SALON (Dec. 21, 1998, 3:00 PM), www.salon.com/1998/
12/21/straight_44/.
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.com was available approximately 90% of the time.19 By the end of 2002
and continuing into 2003, however, Google was blocked to PRC users for
various periods of time as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wished to
limit access to information that was harmful to the party’s interests.20 In
response, Google launched guge ( , “Google China”), available at
google.cn, in January, 2006, to cater to both the Chinese market and CCP
officials as Google China would be censored by Google itself.21 With de-
pendable access to Google China, PRC citizens quickly drove Google’s
market and revenue share from approximately 10% to over 35% within
three fiscal years.22 For Google China, the future appeared bright.
In June of 2009, however, Google China’s operations came to a
screeching halt. After being accused of allowing individuals to search for
pornography, the PRC government “punished” Google by suspending
users’ ability to search foreign websites and utilize Google’s well-known
associate search function.23 Contrast this to a similar situation encoun-
tered by Baidu ( ), the “Chinese Google,” which actively advertised,
disseminated, and profited from Chinese-language searches for porno-
graphic images and videos during the now infamous Edison Chen sex
scandal.24
Baidu’s slap on the wrist consisted of an official government censure
and a requirement that Baidu apologize for its actions.25 Furthermore,
Baidu was one of China’s largest violators of copyrights, generating a sub-
stantial portion of its revenue by knowingly providing access to copyright-
19. Justine Lau, A History of Google in China, FIN. TIMES (July 9, 2010, 1:29 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/faf86fbc-0009-11df-8626-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JrdclBiS
(“2000- Google begins offering a Chinese-language version of Google.com. But the website,
which cannot be accessed about 10 per cent of the time, is slow and unreliable, apparently
because of the extensive filtering performed by China’s licensed internet service providers.”).
20. See id. (detailing the timeline of Google China, which shows that access to Google
within the PRC was only continuous after it removed links to human rights stories); see also
China Blocking Google, BBC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2002, 12:07 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/2231101.stm (“Analysts say this is the first time Beijing has blocked access to an
internet search engine. It comes ahead of a Communist Party congress in November which is
expected to see sweeping changes to the country’s leadership.”).
21. Lau, supra note 19. This information is provided for background purposes and to R
reveal the true reason why Google China was founded. As will be explained later, Google
was not legally required to censor itself, but simply suffered discriminatory demands by the
CCP.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Kenneth Tan, Edison Chen sex scandal: Witchhunt Hits China, SHANGHAIIST
(Feb. 21, 2008, 12:03 AM), http://shanghaiist.com/2008/02/21/edison_chen_sex.php (“[T]he
government-sponsored Beijing Association of Online Media . . . has censured Baidu for not
blocking what it referred to as ‘dirty pictures.’”).
25. Min Lee, China’s Top Internet Search Engine, Baidu.com, Censured for Allegedly
Spreading Racy Photos, BRISBANE TIMES (Feb. 19, 2008), http://news.brisbanetimes.com.au/
technology/chinas-top-internet-search-engine-baiducom-censured-for-allegedly-spreading-
racy-photos-20080219-1t4r.html.
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infringing material.26 It is unclear how logical it was to block Google
China’s website as literally tens of thousands of domestic Chinese pornog-
raphy websites remained easily accessible to the PRC public even though
the government knew of them.27 While it appears that many of Google’s
features regained functionality over the next few months, Google’s ser-
vices were regularly reported as blocked in China.28
After a continued pattern of outages, the symbolic straw that broke
the camel’s back was a series of organized attacks targeting U.S. websites,
including Google, in an operation dubbed “Operation Aurora.”29 The
PRC government recruited a well-organized group of hackers as “part of a
coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government
operatives, private security experts and Internet outlaws . . . .”30 While
U.S. companies have been willing to downplay the costs of these attacks,
26. See Press Release, Int’l Fed’n Phonographic Indus., Baidu Faces Potential Multi-
Billion Dollar Liability for Breaching Music Copyrights (Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.ifpi.org/
content/section_news/20080407.html. In 2008, the Music Copyright Society of China and
R2G sued Baidu for streaming and providing links on its own website that could directly
download the MP3 to a user’s computer. Their complaint alleged that Baidu “stealthily pro-
vide[s] unlicensed music streaming and downloading via its Web site, and thus earn signifi-
cant advertising revenues via its massive online traffic brought about by its music download
service.” Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Look Who’s Suing Baidu, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2008, 1:40 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/28/china-baidu-piracy-markets-equity-cx_0228markets1.html.
Baidu was also sued by authors and publishers for its document-sharing services, which
hosted unlicensed digital books. Loretta Chao, Baidu Takes Authors’ Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar.
29, 2011, at B7. Baidu has since responded by paying some royalties, but this did not occur
until only recently and does not cover all copyright-holders. Geoff Duncan, China’s Baidu to
pay royalties on downloaded songs, DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.digitaltrends
.com/international/chinas-baidu-to-pay-royalities-on-downloaded-songs/.
27. See China Shuts Over 60,000 Porn Websites This Year, REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2010,
12:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/30/china-internet-idUSTOE6BT01T20101
230.
28. Lau, supra note 19. R
29. See Stefanie Hoffman, RSA: Aurora Hackers Targeted Google Source Code, CRN
(Mar. 4, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.crn.com/news/security/223101584/rsa-aurora-hackers-tar
geted-google-source-code.htm;jsessionid=faXYaQTlXMSYH8EKMB8bFg**.ecappj01. Op-
eration Aurora combined “unprecedented tactics” through encryption, security flaw exploita-
tion, and “stealth programming” seeking to access intellectual property and user account
information from several of the United States’ largest companies, including Google, Adobe,
and many more. Kim Zetter, Google Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details
Show, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2010, 8:01 PM) http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-
aurora/ (“ ‘We have never ever, outside of the defense industry, seen commercial industrial
companies come under that level of sophisticated attack,’ says Dmitri Alperovitch, vice presi-
dent of threat research for McAfee. ‘It’s totally changing the threat model.’ “).
30. Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplo-
macy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at A1. “[T]he hacker attacks which forced Google to quit
China in January were orchestrated by a senior member of the Politburo who typed his own
name into the global version of the search engine and found articles criticizing him person-
ally.” David Leigh, US Embassy Cables Leak Sparks Global Diplomatic Crisis, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 28, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cable-
leak-diplomacy-crisis.
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the damage to U.S. companies, including Google, was immense.31 Google
reported that not only were the contents of some of its users’ e-mails re-
vealed, including the then-jailed Ai Weiwei,32 but that the hackers had
succeeded in stealing some of Google’s intellectual property about how its
websites’ algorithms and operating systems were designed.33 Soon after,
Google responded to the PRC government by announcing that they would
discontinue self-censoring Google China’s search results.34 Several days
later, out of concern for their workforce in the PRC, Google announced
that they would simply allow users to redirect to Google Hong Kong,
which remains uncensored.35 In reality, however, this requires extra effort
by any PRC user in utilizing Google because Google China, itself, is not
functional but requires them to reconnect to Google Hong Kong’s URL.36
In an effort to save face from intense international criticism, China re-
newed Google China’s operating license, but its long-term legal status re-
mains in doubt.37
Google’s operations in China have certainly strained under the mas-
sive weight of the PRC government.38 Google’s estimated market share of
31. See Zetter, supra note 29 (explaining that valuable intellectual property was R
targeted by the hackers); see also David Drummond, A New Approach to China, GOOGLE
BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010), googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html; Pooja
Prasad, Adobe Investigates Corporate Network Security Issue, ADOBE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010,
3:16 PM), blogs.adobe.com/conversations/2010/01/adobe_investigates_corporate_n.html.
32. See Jamil Anderlini, The Chinese Dissident’s ‘Unknown Visitors’, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
15, 2010, 1:34 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/c590cdd0-016a-11df-8c54-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz2IvOipJ86.
33. Ben Worthen, Researcher Says Up to 100 Victims in Google Attack, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 26, 2010, 7:15 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870462500457509011
1817090670.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Kim Zetter, Google Hackers Had Ability to Alter
Source Code, WIRED (Mar. 4, 2010, 11:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/
source-code-hacks/.
34. Our History in Depth, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/corporate/
company/history.html (last visited July 21, 2013).
35. Chloe Albenesius, Google: We’re Committed to Not Censoring in China, PC MAG
.COM (Mar. 2, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2360848,00.asp; Cade
Metz, Google Redirects China to Uncensored Hong Kong Servers, THE REGISTER (Mar. 22,
2010, 9:32 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/22/google_redirects_china_to_hong_
kong/.
36. See Jacqui Cheng, Google Stops Hong Kong Auto-Redirect as China Plays Hard-
ball, ARSTECHNICA (June 29, 2010, 11:53 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/06/
google-tweaks-china-to-hong-kong-redirect-same-results/.
37. Lau, supra note 19. R
38. The Chairman of Google, Eric Schmidt, recently detailed how Google China is
unlikely to recover anytime soon. Alexei Oreskovic, Google in Industry’s “Defining Fight”
with Apple, Schmidt Says, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2012, 12:37 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
2012/10/11/us-google-android-idUKBRE89A03120121011 (“Schmidt also said he did not ex-
pect Google to become a significant player in China any time soon, following its 2010 stand-
off with the government over Web censorship and cyber-attacks that Google said originated
in China. Google relocated its search engine to Hong Kong in the wake of the episode, al-
lowing Chinese search engine Baidu Inc. to widen its lead in China, one of the few markets in
the world where Google’s search engine is not dominant. ‘Baidu will continue to be the
Number One player in China for a long time,’ Schmidt said. He said that he did not expect
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the PRC market now stands at a paltry 10.7%.39 Although not the focus of
this Note, Google’s other businesses in the PRC have suffered as well,
including Google’s mobile phone operating software,40 as potential busi-
ness partners fled in fear of associating with a CCP-condemned com-
pany.41 Furthermore, YouTube, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Google, has
remained completely unavailable in the PRC since 2009.42 There is un-
likely to be an effort on the part of the PRC government to prevent copy-
right infringement via streaming web-players because YouTube’s major
Chinese competitors, TuDou ( ) and YouKu ( ), host massive
amounts of illegal material, including U.S. videos43 and politically subver-
sive content, before censors remove it.44 It is clear from this short but
complicated history that Google China has been put at an incredible dis-
advantage compared to its competitors for reasons that often don’t appear
to be logically related to the PRC government’s stated intentions.
The second most publicized case concerning censorship in the PRC
involves social media giant Facebook. In 2008, individuals attempting to
access Facebook from the PRC began to experience problems,45 and in
2009, the Xinjiang race riots led the PRC government to block access to
Facebook in the PRC.46 Currently, a minority of PRC web users has access
to the original Facebook via VPNs or proxies that have not yet been
any mending of ties with the Chinese government, which he said has cut off access to
Google’s Web services in the past. ‘China has in its power to arbitrarily restrict our access to
Chinese citizens to keep us at whatever percentage market share they wish,’ Schmidt said.”).
39. Baidu and Google Lead in Internet Market Share, RESONANCE CHINA (Jan. 5,
2011), http://www.resonancechina.com/2011/01/05/baidu-and-google-lead-in-china-internet-
market-share/.
40. See, e.g., Google Postpones China Mobiles After Censorship Row, BBC NEWS (Jan.
19, 2011, 11:46 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8467491.stm.
41. See China Firm Boycotts Google, STUFF (Mar. 24, 2010, 8:48 AM), http://www
.stuff.co.nz/technology/3499269/China-firm-boycotts-Google (“Companies, however, are lia-
ble to think twice about maintaining a partnership with a company that has been condemned
by Beijing for running afoul of its censorship rules.”).
42. Dan Ritter, Will China’s Popular Video Platform Compete with YouTube in the
U.S.?, WALL ST. CHEAT SHEET (Sept. 30, 2012), http://wallstcheatsheet.com/stocks/will-chi-
nas-popular-video-platform-compete-with-youtube-in-the-u-s.html/ (“Google’s YouTube re-
mains blocked in China.”); YouTube Blocked in China, CNN (Mar. 25, 2009), http://articles
.cnn.com/2009-03-25/tech/youtube.china_1_video-sharing-youtube-tibet-and-taiwan?_s=PM:
TECH.
43. See Michael Kan, China Video Site Promotes Legitimate Content, PCWORLD (Aug.
18, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/203562/china_video_site_promotes_legiti
mate_content.html.
44. See David Pierson, The Man Behind the Chinese Equivalent of YouTube, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/14/business/la-fi-himi-
koo14-2010feb14.
45. See John Kennedy, China: Facebook Blocked? Not quite!, GLOBAL VOICES ADVO-
CACY (July 4, 2008, 8:46 PM), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/04/china-
facebook-blocked-not-quite/.
46. Robin Wauters, China Blocks Access to Twitter, Facebook After Riots, WASH.
POST (July 7, 2009, 4:41 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
07/07/AR2009070701162.html.
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blocked by the PRC government.47 As a result, Facebook lookalikes that
had originally popped up as unpopular alternatives have captured the mar-
ket for social networking services, with the main competitor, Renren
( ), boastfully referring to itself as “the Facebook of China.”48 From
a one-time dominant position in the PRC market, Facebook’s market-
share in the PRC has become negligible, as have its operating profits in the
jurisdiction.49
As this background information makes clear, both Google and
Facebook have faced enormous setbacks in market-share at the hands of
the PRC government. In the period of time that this economic and diplo-
matic battle continues to rage, Google and Facebook are the most promi-
nent examples of how the PRC censorship regime has affected U.S.
companies and, in turn, the U.S. economy. The next step is to explore
which Chinese laws and practices have resulted in this situation and lay the
factual framework for a possible challenge to the PRC’s policies.
II. A MARKET ANALYSIS: THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK
After discussing the obstacles U.S. companies among the likes of
Google and Facebook have faced in the PRC, it is necessary to understand
where this official behavior does or does not derive its power. This Part
will examine the various sources of law in the PRC to illustrate how they
have resulted in an inconsistent set of legal rules prone to abuse with a
series of discriminatory effects.
Like nearly all of its global contemporaries, the overarching structure
of the PRC government finds its source of power in its constitution, the
Constitution of the PRC.50 While the PRC’s system of law has improved
by leaps and bounds, there are many areas where the rule of law is only
beginning to develop.51 Freedom of speech and transmission of communi-
cation are two examples of underdeveloped areas.52
47. Charles Arthur, China Cracks Down On VPN Use, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2011,
11:41 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/may/13/china-cracks-down-on-vpn-
use. It is likely that the percentage of people with access to Facebook through a VPN is very
small. See Hal Roberts et al., 2010 Circumvention Tool Usage Report 2 (Harv. Univ. Berk-
man Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, 2010), available at cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harv
ard.edu/files/2010_Circumvention_Tool_Usage_Report.pdf.
48. See Sunny Ye, Can Sina Weibo Enterprise Edition Kickstart Social eCommerce?,
TECHRICE (June 17, 2011), http://techrice.com/2011/06/17/can-sina-weibo-enterprise-edition-
kickstart-social-ecommerce-graphic/.
49. See Puneet Pal Singh, Facebook: Can Mark Zuckerberg Crack the Chinese Mar-
ket?, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2012, 11:46 AM), www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18082900.
50. XIANFA [Constitution], (2004) (China).
51. Joseph Kahn, Deep Flaws, and Little Justice, in China’s Court System, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2005, at A1; see also Rule by Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.–Sept. 2005, http://www.nytimes
.com/ref/world/asia/rule_index.html (examining, through a nine-part series, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s struggle in creating a modern legal system).
52. See Jim Yardley, In Worker’s Death, View of China’s Harsh Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2005, at A1 (“Online discussion was censored and news media coverage was almost
completely banned”). The PRC’s judiciary also has a great deal of room to grow as it is not
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Under the Constitution of the PRC, all “citizens of the People’s Re-
public of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
association, of procession and of demonstration.”53 Article 35, which
grants these broad freedoms, is one of the few articles in the PRC Consti-
tution that does not list any exceptions or clarifications to its provisions.54
Unique to the PRC Constitution is a further section that includes what is
traditionally considered part of free speech. Article 40 of the Constitution
of the PRC specifies that “the freedom and privacy of correspondence of
citizens of the People’s Republic of China are protected by law.”55 Unlike
Article 35, Article 40 allows this right to be limited under two narrow cir-
cumstances—first, where disclosure of the correspondence is necessary to
state security, and second, where the correspondence relates to a criminal
offense.56 However, practice is often different from the law.
A simple and straightforward reading of the Constitution of the PRC
might lead one to believe that freedom of speech is a near absolute right in
the PRC. Nevertheless, PRC citizens’ right to free speech is often lim-
ited,57 and their electronic communications are subject to warrantless in-
terceptions.58 The PRC governments on the central, provincial, and city
levels, combined, have tens of thousands of employees to monitor Internet
activity, block websites, and remove content.59 Such a system is addition-
ally effective in achieving its ends because its pervasiveness encourages
ordinary individuals, journalists, and publishers to censor themselves.60
legally independent from the CCP and it has only been about ten years since new judges
were required to have a legal education. WORLD SAAVY MONITOR, The Legal System in
China, in MODERN CHINA: THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF AN EMERGING SUPERPOWER
(2008), available at http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti
cle&id=113&Itemid=176; Judicial Reform in China 3–4 (Org. Am. States, 2007), available at
www.der.oas.org/Catedra/Reform%20in%20China.doc. Additionally, criminal defendants in
the PRC do not appear to benefit from the same presumption of innocence as in the United
States. Kahn, supra note 51. R
53. XIANFA art. 35 (2004) (China).
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 40.
56. Id. These provisions appear somewhat redundant as threats to national security
are, under normal circumstances, also criminal matters.
57. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2012: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (2012), available at http://files.amnesty.org/air12/air_2012_full
_en.pdf.
58. See Cisco Accused of Helping Chinese Police Track Dissidents, INT’L OPERATIONS
GRP. (May 27, 2011), http://interopsgroup.com/cisco-accused-helping-chinese-police-track-
dissidents/ (“The complaint charges that Cisco ‘designed, supplied, and helped maintain a
censorship and surveillance network known as the Golden Shield in collaboration with Chi-
nese Community [sic] Party and Chinese Public Security officials, knowing and intending that
it would be utilized [by authorities] to eavesdrop, tap, and intercept communications, identify
and track Plaintiffs as Falun Gong members for the specific purpose of subjecting them to
gross human rights abuses.’”).
59. See Antone Gonsalves, Chinese Internet Censorship Machine Revealed, INFO. WK
(Oct. 11, 2007, 3:52 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/202401567.
60. CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, INFORMATION CONTROL AND SELF-CENSORSHIP
IN THE PRC AND THE SPREAD OF SARS 6 (2003), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/
34040-m
il_34-4 Sheet No. 101 Side A      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 101 Side A      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL404.txt unknown Seq: 11 10-OCT-13 10:02
Summer 2013] A Dual Track Approach 867
Although the Constitution of the PRC prohibits most forms of In-
ternet censorship,61 the PRC government has issued a series of regulations
granting itself the power to control communication on the Internet. The
legislative branches of the PRC first issued rules on Internet use when the
Internet was in its initial stages of growth. In 1997, the 42nd Standing Con-
vention of the State Council adopted the Temporary Regulations for the
Management of Computer Information Network International Connec-
tion (Temporary Regulations).62 The Temporary Regulations remain in
full effect to the present day, fifteen years after they were initially
adopted.63 The Temporary Regulations provide that all internet communi-
cations must pass through ChinaNet, GBNet, CERNET, or CTSNET, all
of which are PRC government-controlled server systems.64 A complemen-
tary regulation, the “Regulation of the People’s Republic of China for
Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems,” charges the Minis-
try of Public Security with supervision, inspection, and guidance of In-
ternet development.65 The regulation also allows the Ministry of Public
Security to investigate any criminal cases involving use of the Internet.66
Soon after, the Ministry of Public Security issued the regulations that are
well-known today and cited by various levels of the PRC government as
news/prcControl_SARS.pdf (“The PRC legal system discourages the free flow of information
not only by erecting barriers to participation by non-government-controlled institutions, but
also by encouraging individual self-censorship.”); see also Ruven Chu et al., Communism and
Computer Ethics: Privacy, STANFORD U., http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~eroberts/cs201/
projects/communism-computing-china/privacy.html (last visited July 21, 2013) (“There is no
guaranteed privacy online in China; data is eavesdropped and intercepted . . . all actions
taken online will always be directly linked to an individual. By reducing peoples [sic] privacy,
people know they will be tracked online, China has also helped further censorship. People,
for fear of breaking laws, will be more cautious online and police themselves behaving as the
government would desire them to. What makes people even more likely to self police is the
lack of clear guidelines on what is and isn’t allow [sic]. The ambiguity of law and the punish-
ments make people more likely to err on the side of caution and stay away from dangerous
boundaries.”); Publish and Be Deleted, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES (Feb. 26, 2010, 10:32 AM),
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/02/global-times-publish-and-be-deleted/.
61. See XIANFA arts. 35, 40 (2004) (China).
62. Zho¯nghua´ re´nmı´n go`nghe´guo´jı`sua`njı¯ xı`nxı¯ waˇngluo` guo´jı` lia´nwaˇng guaˇnlıˇ zha`nxı´ng
guı¯dı`ng ( ), [Interim Provisions of the
People’s Republic of China Governing International Interconnection of Computer-based In-
formation Networks] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 20, 1997, effective May 20, 1997)
(China), [hereinafter Computer Information Regulations] available at http://www.chinalaw
edu.com/news/23223/23228/23205.htm.
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 6. It also requires that all Internet Service Providers be licensed by the
government. Id. art. 8. Any Internet user in the PRC, therefore, relies on government servers
for access to the Internet.
65. Zho¯nghua´ re´nmı´n go`nghe´guo´jı`sua`njı¯ xı`nxı¯ xı`toˇng a¯nqua´n baˇohu` de guı¯ guaˇn
( ) [Regulation of the People’s Republic of
China for Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems] arts. 6, 9, 19 (promulgated by
the St. Council, Feb. 18, 1994, effective Feb 18, 1994) (China), available at http://www.asianlii
.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rfspocis719/.
66. Id. art. 17.
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support for their actions in limiting and monitoring Internet access. The
regulations, issued by the Ministry of Public Security itself,67 prohibit any
communications that defame or attempt to defame government agencies,
split the nation, or leak state secrets.68 These terms have escaped any for-
mal definitions and can encompass almost any situation.69
The regulations described above have tremendously altered the land-
scape of electronic communications in the PRC. Because all communica-
tions go through government servers, there is no information that the PRC
government cannot monitor or block.70 Additionally, some provinces and
cities go even further in censoring and monitoring Internet communica-
tions within their jurisdiction.71 This practice can often result in the arbi-
trary and inconsistent censorship of Internet websites, as some censors are
more restrictive than others.72
Although the regulations have not been enforced consistently on a
city or provincial level, they have universally affected speech. The PRC
has the largest number of jailed cyber-dissidents of any country in the
world.73 The level of censorship sophistication is so great in the PRC that
it has resulted in the blockage of tens of thousands of websites.74 In rela-
tion to Google and Facebook, the recent censorship regime has cost
Google China over 105.8 million users.75 The loss in revenue due to the
blockage is estimated to cost Google $600 million dollars per year in In-
67. The PRC central government benefits from what Westerners might identify as
“plausible deniability.” The PRC government has several layers of government and citizens
usually blame lower officials as they are under the impression that the highest members of
the PRC government are unaware of their inferior officers’ bad acts. See Gudrun Wacker,
Chinese Civil Society at a Time of Leadership Change, EUR. UNION INST. FOR SECURITY
STUD. (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/chinese-civil-society-
at-a-time-of-leadership-change/ (“[E]xpressions of dissatisfaction in China—which can some-
times turn violent are usually caused by local issues with protesters blaming local authorities
rather than China’s top leaders or the political system. This local character explains why
nation-wide protests have yet to materialise in China.”); see also Jeffrey Hays, Petitions, Re-
trievers and Black Jails in China, FACTS & DETAILS, http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?
itemid=1647&catid=8&subcatid=50 (last updated Apr. 2012) (describing how many with
grievances against the government file petitions to the authorities in Beijing, because they
“cannot expect the same local officials with whom they have grievances to provide them with
justice.”).
68. HUM. RIGHTS IN CHINA, STATE SECRETS: CHINA’S LEGAL LABYRINTH 117, 231
(2007), available at http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/State-Secrets-Re-
port/HRIC_StateSecrets-Report.pdf.
69. See id.
70. Computer Information Regulations, supra note 62, art. 6. R
71. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN
CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 18 (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/china0806webwcover.pdf.
72. See id. at 3-6.
73. Jim Lobe, 2003 Bad Year for Press Freedom, ONEWORLD (Jan. 6, 2004), http://uk
.oneworld.net/article/view/76161/1/1980.
74. China Shuts Over 60,000 Porn Websites This Year, supra note 27. R
75. Calculated by estimating the market-share of Google China based on 420 million
Internet users. See Baidu and Google Lead in Internet Market Share, supra note 39. R
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ternet services alone.76 The thefts of source code during various hacking
operations that were either sponsored by government or uncontrolled by
government have also benefited Chinese companies.77 As Google and
Facebook have continued to suffer from being censored or blocked, their
PRC competitors have gained massively in market share, revenue, and
profit.78 This is notable because they offer nearly identical services.79
Thus, U.S.-based companies appear to be discriminated against for being
foreign entrants in the PRC market.
In addition to being a prominent body of adjudication on international
trade issues, turning to the WTO would also avoid litigation within the
PRC. The PRC legal system may be developing quickly, but still has some
way to go.80 Judges in the PRC are frequently Chinese Communist Party
activists appointed to the bench, and many do not have a legal education
or background.81 As a result, a PRC judge cannot necessarily be expected
to fairly evaluate the CCP-promulgated censorship policies nor to uphold
a verdict against the PRC. The consequence of such a situation is that
Google and Facebook may be better off having the U.S. government pur-
sue their claims in the WTO instead of in the PRC courts.82
76. See Dan Frommer, Google China’s Exposure: $600 Million in Sales This Year, BUS-
INESS INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2010, 9:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/googles-china-expo-
sure-600-million-in-sales-this-year-lots-of-future-growth-2010-1.
77. Josh Rogin, China’s expansion of economic espionage bails over, FOREIGN POLICY
(Jan. 14, 2010, 1:11 AM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/13/china_s_expan
sion_of_economic_espionage_boils_over (“The Chinese government has adapted the tactics
it has used for military cyber espionage for corporate purposes and is now using them on a
wide scale . . . Some China experts contend that Google, which has been operating in China
since 2004, may be simply fed up with the Chinese government’s pattern of allowing in for-
eign companies and then appropriating their technology for the benefit of Chinese competi-
tors, in this case the rival search engine Baidu.”). Chinese companies, surprisingly, have not
been negatively affected or suffered losses in service in the hacking attempts. Stefanie Hoff-
man, RSA: Aurora Hackers Targeted Google Source Code, CRN (Mar. 4, 2010, 2:28 PM),
http://www.crn.com/news/security/223101584/rsa-aurora-hackers-targeted-google-source-
code.htm;jsessionid=faXYaQTlXMSYH8EKMB8bFg**.ecappj01.
78. See Baidu and Google Lead in Internet Market Share, supra note 39. R
79. Baidu, RenRen, TuDou, and YouKu serve nearly identical functions as their U.S.
competitors and also have their content censored by the government in the same manner. See
BIDU Company Profile, MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/
BIDU/profile (last visited July 21, 2013); RENN Company Profile, MARKETWATCH, http://
www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/RENN/profile (last visited July 21, 2013); YOKU
Company Profile, MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/YOKU/pro-
file (last visited July 21, 2013). The censorship mechanisms will be described further below.
See Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem), N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2006, (Magazine), at 6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/
23google.html?pagewanted=8&ei=5090&en=972002761056363f&ex=1303444800.
80. See Rule by Law, supra note 51. R
81. See Jerome A. Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party at 90: Relying on Repression,
U.S. ASIA L. INST. (June 21, 2011), http://www.usasialaw.org/?p=5570.
82. It is notable that the PRC courts cleared a suit against Baidu by a Western record-
ing industry organization but that the Music Copyright Society of China was successful on the
same grounds. See Jacqui Cheng, Baidu Cleared in Copyright Infringement Case Brought by
IFPI, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 26, 2010, 1:14 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/01/
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III. GATS OBLIGATIONS PROHIBIT PRC CENSORSHIP
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Not only are the PRC’s censorship policies arguably illegal under the
PRC constitution,83 but they are also prohibited under several WTO obli-
gations, including GATS. This Part will analyze PRC censorship policies
through the lens of GATS law through two different legal principles. The
first application will examine the PRC’s GATS commitment schedule and
show that under all relevant categories, the present state of PRC censor-
ship is inconsistent with these promises. Second, an application of GATS’
Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle similarly renders the current PRC
regulatory scheme relating to censorship illegal.
A. Preliminary Steps to Examining the PRC’s Commitment Schedule
The signature feature of GATS is that it encourages, but does not re-
quire, member countries to make commitments as to how they will treat
services.84 These promises are reflected in each member country’s Com-
mitment Schedule.85 The Commitment Schedule contains both horizontal
and specific commitments.86 Horizontal commitments apply to all sectors
of trade, while specific commitments apply only to sectors explicitly listed
by the member country.87 Commitment Schedules break the treatment of
services into four modes of supply.88 The four modes of supply are “cross-
border supply,” “consumption abroad,” “commercial presence,” and
“presence of a natural person.”89 Additionally, the Commitment Schedule
baidu-cleared-in-copyright-infringement-case-brought-by-ifpi/; Music Copyright Society Wins
Suit Against Baidu, MARBRIDGE CONSULTING (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.marbridgeconsult
ing.com/marbridgedaily/2010-02-23/article/33753/music_copyright_society_wins_suit_against_
baidu; see also Cao Yin, Writers Win Copyright Lawsuit Against Baidu, PEOPLE’S DAILY ON-
LINE (Sept. 19, 2012, 8:17 AM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90882/7952883.html.
83. XIANFA arts. 35, 40 (2004) (China).
84. See GATS art. I.
85. See id. art. XX.
86. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage and
Disciplines, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm
(last visited July 21, 2013).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
Cross-border supply is defined to cover services that flow from the territory of one
Member into the territory of another Member (e.g. banking or architectural ser-
vices transmitted via telecommunications or mail); Consumption abroad refers to
situations where a service consumer (e.g. tourist or patient) moves into another
Member’s territory to obtain a service; Commercial presence implies that a service
supplier of one Member establishes a territorial presence, including through own-
ership or lease of premises, in another Member’s territory to provide a service (e.g.
domestic subsidiaries of foreign insurance companies or hotel chains); and Pres-
ence of natural persons consists of persons of one Member entering the territory of
another Member to supply a service (e.g. accountants, doctors or teachers). The
Annex on Movement of Natural Persons specifies, however, that Members remain
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provides both the limitations on “market access” and “national treat-
ment.”90 The purpose of the Commitment Schedule is for countries to
slowly build upon their previous commitments, thereby ratcheting open
their economies.91 Countries are strongly encouraged not to go back on
their commitments, but they are legally allowed to withdraw them.92 Nev-
ertheless, it is rare for a country to remove its commitments and such abdi-
cation will only take effect once the commitment is officially removed. The
levels of treatment specified in the Commitment Schedules are made le-
gally binding through Articles XVI and XVIII. As such, reliance on Com-
mitment Schedules in proceedings is a “justified practice.”93
The first step in applying GATS to the controversy at hand is deter-
mining whether GATS actually applies. That is to say, is Internet commu-
nication considered a service within the meaning of the GATS and its
related Commitment Schedule? GATS came into existence when the In-
ternet was still a burgeoning form of communication, but by the time the
PRC ascended to the WTO, the Internet and its potential impact were
known across the world.94 In fact, section 2, subsection c, Telecommunica-
tion Services of the PRC’s Concession Schedule, explicitly includes “elec-
tronic mail,” “on-line information and database retrieval,” “electronic
data interchange,” and “on-line information and/or data processing.”95
The PRC chose to add these services to their Commitment Schedule even
though the Central Product Classification, which is the complete list of
product classifications utilized within the WTO, did not include those
items at the time of the PRC’s accession.96
free to operate measures regarding citizenship, residence or access to the employ-
ment market on a permanent basis.
Id.
90. Id.
91. See Services: Rules for Growth and Investment, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www
.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2013) (“These
clearly defined commitments are ‘bound’: like bound tariffs for trade in goods, they can only
be modified after negotiations with affected countries. Because ‘unbinding’ is difficult, the
commitments are virtually guaranteed conditions for foreign exporters and importers of ser-
vices and investors in the sector to do business.”).
92. See GATS art. XXI.
93. Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commit-
ments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/92 (Mar. 28, 2001) (“Since
schedules, including footnotes, headnotes and attachments, are a record of legal commit-
ments, nothing should appear in them which a Member does not intend to be legally
binding.”).
94. See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20139, CHINA AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1 (2001).
95. Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter PRC Concession
Schedule].
96. U.N. Statistics Division, U.N. Statistical Commission, Central Product Classifica-
tion, CPC Version 1.1, ESA/STAT/SER.M/77/Ver.1.1 (Feb. 21, 2002), unstats.un.org/unsd/
statcom/doc02/cpc.pdf [hereinafter Central Product Classification].
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Further confirmation that GATS covers services delivered via the In-
ternet can be found from various WTO resources, including the Appellate
Body’s decision in United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (U.S.—Gambling).97 In U.S.—
Gambling, Antigua and Barbuda brought a case against the United States
for its restrictions on online gambling.98 Antigua and Barbuda argued that
the United States’ Commitment Schedule specified that there would be no
restrictions on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services
while the United States argued that it had made no such commitment.99
Both the Panel and Appellate Body found that the United States had vio-
lated its obligations because its commitment to leaving gambling and bet-
ting services unrestricted also applied to online gambling. This is known as
the “technological neutrality” principle, meaning that, subject to a mem-
ber country’s commitments to the contrary, services can be transmitted
through any means of delivery.100 This principle is well accepted among
WTO members and was also upheld in China—Measures Affecting Trad-
ing Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovi-
sual Entertainment Product (China—Audiovisual).101 Additionally, the
Council on Trade in Services, the WTO committee charged with examin-
ing GATS in light of current developments, has plainly stated that GATS
covers electronically delivered services, citing unanimity in WTO member
opinion.102 As such, the evidence suggests that both the PRC and substan-
tive WTO law intended GATS to apply to Internet services.
The second step in a GATS analysis ordinarily involves examining
which mode of supply has been utilized. In electronic communication
there is some debate about whether the information has been accessed by
97. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Appel-
late Body Report].
98. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services, ¶ 1.1—1.3, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Panel
Report].
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 6.285 (“Therefore, a market access commitment for mode 1 implies the right
for other Members’ suppliers to supply a service through all means of delivery, whether by
mail, telephone, Internet etc., unless otherwise specified in a Member’s Schedule. We note
that this is in line with the principle of ‘technological neutrality’, which seems to be largely
shared among WTO Members.”).
101. Id. ¶ 3.161; Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶
398, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China—Audiovisual Products].
102. Council for Trade in Services, Interim Report to the General Council: Work Pro-
gramme on Electronic Commerce, S/C/8 (Mar. 31, 1999) (“Members agreed that GATS ap-
plied to all services regardless of the means of technology by which they were delivered. This
was further reinforced by the fact that in no area of the WTO were there different rules for
different techniques of delivery. It was noted that the principle of technological neutrality
also applied to scheduled commitments, unless the schedule specified otherwise: it was there-
fore possible for Members to schedule commitments in a non-technologically neutral
manner.”).
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a citizen inside of the country or outside of the country. This is important
because it may affect the level of treatment accorded by a concession
schedule if it specifies different treatment between mode 1 and mode 2
forms of supply.103 The Panel report in U.S.—Gambling suggests that In-
ternet service consumption from a foreign source will ordinarily be classi-
fied as mode 1 of supply.104 Although this will not always be the case, the
classification has little impact in this instance as the application of both
modes’ provisions weigh against the PRC’s censorship regime, as discussed
below.
Thirdly, a critical step in any legal analysis of whether a member has
upheld their GATS commitments is determining whether the complained
of behavior qualifies as a domestic regulation or a limitation on market
access. Domestic regulations are measures that apply to all services within
the country, while limitations on market access apply solely to services
flowing into the country from abroad.105 The distinction is important be-
cause domestic regulations are ordinarily subject to less scrutiny at the
WTO.106 Article XVI of the GATS, which covers market access, provides
that no member may treat services less favorably than its Commitment
Schedule states.107 Article VI, in turn, specifies that members must ensure
that rules affecting services are administered in a “reasonable, objective
and impartial manner.”108
B. Application of the PRC’s Commitment Schedule
Although it may appear that deciding which category a measure falls
into is a question of law, any complicated analysis will almost inevitably be
intensely fact-specific. Both the details described above and case law, how-
ever, quickly illustrate that the PRC’s policies are a limitation on market
103. As addressed previously, mode 1 is cross-border supply and mode 2 is consump-
tion abroad. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage and
Disciplines, supra note 86. While Google did own a subsidiary in China to provide these R
services previously, all of its relevant physical operations are now located outside of the PRC.
See Lau, supra note 19. R
104. Panel Report, supra note 98, ¶ 3.29. The Appellate Body did not overrule this R
portion of the Panel Report. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 97. R
105. GATS, supra note 12, art. XVI; id., art. VI (“In sectors where specific commit- R
ments are undertaken, each Member shall ensure that all measures of general application
affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.”)
(emphasis added).
106. Joost Pauwelyn, Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulations from Mar-
ket Access in GATT and GATS, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 131, 136 (2005) (“As is the case
under GATT, the distinction thus made by GATS between market access and domestic regu-
lation has vital legal consequences. Like quantitative restrictions under Article XI of GATT,
the market access restrictions specified in Article XVI of GATS are, for committed services
sectors, in principle, prohibited (unless they are explicitly listed in the Member’s schedule). In
contrast, like domestic regulations under Article III of GATT, domestic regulations affecting
the supply of services are, in principle, permitted on condition that they do not discriminate
foreign as against domestic services or service suppliers.”) (citations omitted).
107. GATS, supra note 12, art. XVI. R
108. Id. art. VI.
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access. The relevant domestic laws and policies of the PRC, at their most
basic, lay out a relatively straightforward set of rules stating that, although
seemingly in tension with the constitution, the government may monitor
and intercept electronic communications.109 The PRC government also re-
quires that all electronic communications be routed through state-con-
trolled servers. Combined, these two domestic regulations are easily
satisfied: the government has blocked access to certain information and all
PRC users are reliant upon government servers for their Internet connec-
tion.110 These regulations are difficult to avoid as Google and Facebook
must route their traffic via government servers if they hope to provide any
services to PRC users at all.111 Nevertheless, U.S. providers of online ser-
vices, including Google and Facebook, continue to have their access to the
PRC market completely shuttered.112 This is even though providers of
nearly identical online services like Baidu, RenRen, and YouKu continue
to enjoy access to the Chinese market.113 This illustrates that, in practice,
the PRC censorship regime has closed access to mainland China by several
Western companies engaged in online services.
Treating the blockage of Google and Facebook as a market access lim-
itation is also ground in WTO case law.114 In U.S.—Gambling, the United
States had specified a certain level of treatment for gambling services in its
Commitment Schedule.115 Antigua and Barbuda challenged that delivery
of gambling services were impeded by a series of U.S. laws, the blocking of
109. XIANFA art. 35 (2004) (China); see Regulation of the People’s Republic of China
for Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems, supra note 65; Jı`sua`njı¯ xı`nxı¯ waˇng- R
luo` guo´jı` lia´nwaˇng a¯nqua´n baˇohu` guaˇnlıˇ ba`nfaˇ
( ) [Computer Information Network and Internet
Security, Protection and Management Regulations] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public
Security, Dec. 30, 1997) [hereinafter Computer Information Regulations].
110. See Regulation of the People’s Republic of China for Safety Protection of Com-
puter Information Systems, supra note 65; Computer Information Regulations, supra note R
109. R
111. See Regulation of the People’s Republic of China for Safety Protection of Com-
puter Information Systems, supra note 65; Computer Information Regulations, supra note R
109. R
112. See Lau, supra note 19; Wauters, supra note 46. R
113. See Josh Ong, The Great Firewall: China’s Digital Margins, THE NEXT WEB (Oct.
14, 2012, 12:14 PM), http://thenextweb.com/asia/2012/10/14/the-great-firewall-chinas-digital-
margins/ (“Services that we take for granted outside of China, such as search, Twitter,
Facebook and YouTube have all been replaced by Chinese equivalents (namely, Baidu, Sina
Weibo, Renren and Youku Tudou).”).
114. But see Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶¶ 11617, for an example demon- R
strating that not all policies that may affect a service-provider’s ability to provide services in a
country should be treated as market access limitations.
115. Panel Report, supra note 98, at para. 7.2(a); see Appellate Body Report, supra R
note 97, at ¶¶ 21213; see also, Case Summary: WTO Internet Gambling Case, PUBLIC CITIZEN R
(Mar. 2007), http://www.citizen.org/documents/gamblingsummary2007.pdf; Dispute Settle-
ment: United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e
.htm (last visited July 21, 2013) (summarizing the case) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement:
United States].
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several websites, and other government actions.116 The case noted that
domestic providers of the same services could operate nearly unencum-
bered in the United States.117 The panel and appellate body treated the
U.S. measures as restrictions on market access.118 In comparison, the PRC
has enacted a regime to block websites it disapproves of without any con-
stitutional grounding. The effects of the PRC-government’s actions and
unofficial policies are similar, as Google and social networking sites such
as Facebook continue to be blocked from any access to the market while
their competitors are not.119 As such, the comparison with U.S.—Gam-
bling indicates that a WTO panel would treat the PRC regime as a market
access limitation.
Moving toward the heart of the matter, the PRC has made three sets
of GATS commitments that are relevant to the situation at hand, two of
which are related directly to the censorship matter.120 The PRC has made
commitments regarding both “Telecommunications Services Value-added
Services” and “Computer and Related Services.” Value-added telecommu-
nications services include e-mail, voice-mail, online information and
database retrieval, electronic data interchange, enhanced facsimile ser-
vices, code and protocol conversion, and online information and/or data
processing.121 In this category, the PRC has made commitments both in
market access and national treatment.122 In terms of national treatment,
the PRC has indicated that there are no limitations.123 Interpreting the
market access limitations is more difficult as Mode 2 is subject to no limi-
tations, but Mode 1 is subject to the same limitations as Mode 3 in market
access limitations: “Foreign service suppliers will be permitted to establish
joint venture value-added telecommunication enterprises, without quanti-
tative restrictions, and provide services . . . foreign investment shall be no
more than 50 per cent.”124
Whether this means that there are no limitations on mode 1 unless the
foreign service supplier chooses to locate operations in the PRC or
whether foreign service suppliers must have operations in the PRC is
somewhat debatable. Although they may not ultimately be conclusive, two
116. Panel Report, supra note 98, ¶¶ 1.12.1. R
117. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶¶ 36164. R
118. Panel Report, supra note 98 at ¶¶ 6.263, 6.421; see Appellate Body Report, supra R
note 97, ¶ 265. R
119. See Ong, supra note 113 (“‘The Chinese government blocked every single interna- R
tional Web 2.0 Internet service, and we Chinese copycat every one,’ he said, describing the
country’s strategy as a simple ‘block and clone’ tactic.”).
120. The PRC government made commitments regarding advertising services, which
serve as a source of revenue for both Google and Facebook. This advertising service is impos-
sible without having their sites accessible in mainland China. Rather, this category would
only become relevant if their websites were actually to become accessible.
121. PRC Concession Schedule, supra note 95, at 17. R
122. Id. at Annex 1.1.
123. Id. at 17.
124. Id.
34040-m
il_34-4 Sheet No. 105 Side B      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 105 Side B      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL404.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-OCT-13 10:02
876 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 34:857
factors weigh heavily in favor of the former interpretation. Based on the
context, it appears that if the PRC had intended to remove all limitations
on foreign service suppliers except for investment, the explanation of limi-
tations would have started with “none, except . . .”125 Additionally, coun-
tries should only be held to the narrow commitments they have made due
to the voluntary nature of the commitment schedules.126
Ultimately, however, both methods of interpretation will lead to simi-
lar results. If it means no limitations, then the PRC government has failed
to fulfill its commitments because it has imposed restrictions in a sector
where it has committed to impose none. As described above, the PRC has
blocked access to Google, YouTube, and Facebook in mainland China al-
though its immediate competitors continue to operate in the same fashion
as their U.S. counterparts would. There are no explicit laws or regulations
that require the companies to censor information themselves, so it cannot
be the case that the U.S. telecommunication providers have failed to up-
hold any legal obligation.127 This is supported by the fact that the PRC
government has been credited as having the most advanced Internet con-
trols of any government in the world and censors all of the information
itself so it is even more irrational to expect private corporations to censor
at a level any higher than the PRC government’s.128 In fact, the method
whereby search engine providers in the PRC determine which sites should
be blocked is by systematically accessing every known Internet address
and seeing which ones are not retrievable.129 Thus, the PRC government’s
actions appear to be inconsistent with its Telecommunications Services
Value-added Services obligations contained in its Commitment Schedule.
The same conclusion is also reached if the PRC’s policies are inter-
preted as requiring foreign providers to enter into joint ventures before
they can offer telecommunications services in mainland China. The PRC
government requires most Wholly-Foreign Owned Enterprises (WFOEs)
to establish some sort of joint venture with a local company, often related
to the local government, to engage in any sort of business.130 Disregarding
125. See id.; see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, ¶ 21465 (Apr. 7,
2005).
126. See GATS, supra note 12, art. XIX (The WTO remains conscious of individual R
member’s sovereignty); see also Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization?
Criticism, yes . . . misinformation, no!, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/misinf_e/09sov_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2013).
127. See Computer Information Regulations, supra note 109; Regulation of the Peo- R
ple’s Republic of China for Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems, supra note
109. R
128. CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, INFORMATION CONTROL AND SELF-CENSORSHIP
IN THE PRC AND THE SPREAD OF SARS 6 (2003), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/
news/prcControl_SARS.pdf.
129. See Thompson, supra note 79. R
130. Zho¯nghua´ re´nmı´n go`nghe´guo´ zho¯ngwa`i he´zı¯ jı¯ngyı´ng qıˇye` faˇ
( ) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Joint Ventures] art. 1 (promulgated by the Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong., effective July 1,
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the merits of such a system, it is clear that Google is compliant with this
standard through its legal status and presence in the PRC.131 Nor has the
PRC government claimed that Google has violated this condition.
Facebook, however, is a different story. At the time of this analysis,
Facebook has no sort of legal physical presence in the PRC, but this is
largely because it would be impossible for it to create one. Facebook is
banned in the PRC and it would be an enormous and unjustified risk to
create a government backlash against a possible joint venture partner.132
Google’s own story is a reminder of this lesson as most of its business
partners in the mobile telecommunication industry suddenly ceased coop-
eration after the PRC government began to target Google.133 As
Facebook cannot be expected to fulfill this obligation due to the PRC-
government’s own measures to prevent Facebook’s compliance, Facebook
should be excused from meeting this legal requirement.
Even though a WTO panel and appellate body would likely interpret
the PRC’s regulations as a market access limitation as they did in U.S.—
Gambling, the result of analyzing the measures as limitations on national
treatment would be much the same.134 In its Commitment Schedule, the
PRC has committed itself to imposing no limitations to the national treat-
ment of foreign service suppliers.135 Quite simply, this requires that the
PRC government treat foreign companies, including Google and
Facebook, just like it would treat domestic companies. As detailed above,
1979), available at http://www.china.org.cn/business/laws_regulations/2007-06/22/content_121
4773.htm (China). Jeffrey Hays, Foreign Companies and Foreign Investment in China, FACTS
AND DETAILS, http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=349 (last visited July 21, 2013)
(“Foreign companies doing business in China are generally required to form joint ventures
with Chinese companies instead of forming wholly owned subsidiaries.”). There is evidence
that the PRC government has become less adamant about foreign companies forming joint
ventures with domestic partners in order to enter the PRC market. Nevertheless, in indus-
tries that are considered “sensitive” or where it would be beneficial for a PRC partner to
acquire industrial knowledge, the PRC government continues to require any foreign entrants
to form a joint venture with a domestic partner. MAARTEN ROOS, CHINESE COMMERCIAL
LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 131 (2010) (“Chinese law continues to restrict foreign investors
from operating wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries. In these industries, the only way for for-
eign investors to legally participate is through a joint venture with a local counterpart. Typical
examples of industries that remain open only to Chinese-foreign joint ventures, as deter-
mined in the Foreign Investment Catalogue, are car manufacturing, life-insurance, finance,
securities, printing telecommunications, and certain mining activities.”).
131. See Kathrin Hille, Speculation grows on Google’s future in China, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2010, 12:30 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fa374b78-3350-11df-bc32-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz2KvxohA1Z (“The company operates google.cn, its China-registered website,
under a joint venture with a domestic partner because Chinese law bars foreign investors
from holding controlling stakes in the Internet content business.”); Lau, supra note 19. R
132. See Wauters, supra note 46. R
133. Google Postpones China Mobiles After Censorship Row, supra note 40. R
134. Indeed, many scholars have argued that Article XVI and Article XVII greatly
overlap under current WTO jurisprudence. Panagiotis Delimatsis, The Interaction Between
GATS Articles VI, XVI, XVII and XVIII after the U.S. Gambling Case, NCCR TRADE REG. 1
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088758.
135. PRC Concession Schedule, supra note 95. R
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however, Google and Facebook continue to be discriminated against by
the PRC government in favor of competitors with domestic and political
roots in mainland China.
Additionally, the PRC appears to be in violation of Article VI’s main
obligations, found in Section 1: “In sectors where specific commitments
are undertaken, each Member shall ensure that all measures of general
application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable,
objective and impartial manner.”136
Nevertheless, the facts suggest that the PRC’s treatment has not been
reasonable, objective, and impartial. The PRC is required to detail the
procedures and regulations that foreign service providers are expected to
comply with in the country, but no serious effort to do so has been
made.137 Instead, Google and Facebook are expected to uphold a series of
rules that not only appear unconstitutional, but that are also implemented
in an extremely arbitrary and subjective manner. While it has been sug-
gested that the reason for the PRC’s strained relationship with the U.S.
service providers is because they have not engaged in “self-censorship,” no
set of official regulations either explicitly requires or details these de-
mands.138 Additionally, the process of self-censorship appears flawed and
subjective because the PRC has not laid out any standards for determining
which pieces of information should be banned from transmission into the
PRC.139 Instead, “self-censorship” was initiated by a series of search en-
gine and social media providers on their own accord through a process of
systematically attempting to access websites and discovering which were
unavailable in the PRC but available in neighboring and Western coun-
tries.140 This is the only method whereby Google and Facebook could dis-
cover which sites should be blocked in the PRC.141 Additionally, if it is the
PRC’s responsibility to determine which websites pose a threat to the state
and they alone have ultimate control over all PRC servers, it is unreasona-
ble to censor the service providers as a whole rather than the specific in-
formation the PRC has the right to limit references to, as detailed below in
the discussion of Article XIV.142
136. GATS, supra note 12, art. IV (emphasis added). R
137. See id. art. VI. No significant regulations or procedures concerning foreign service
providers have been passed complying with GATS Article IV. Regulation of the People’s
Republic of China for Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems, supra note 65;
Computer Information Regulations, supra note 109. R
138. Computer Information Regulations, supra note 109. No additional laws are regula- R
tions are to be found through the PRC government’s online recourses or elsewhere.
139. Id.
140. See Thompson, supra note 79. R
141. See id.
142. The PRC government does have the right to limit access to certain types of infor-
mation, as discussed later, but cannot limit foreign service providers as a whole without justi-
fication. Additionally, if they have made specific commitments as to particular services they
will allow foreign service providers to make available in the PRC, then those services must
also be allowed electronically.
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The second commitment schedule category in which the PRC has
made commitments is “Computer and Related Services.”143 Unlike the
value-added telecommunication services category, here the PRC directly
refers to the CPC in including “data processing service.”144 As defined by
the CPC, data processing services include: “processing of data supplied by
the customer, tabulation, computation, etc., without any design of specific
software,” “capture of data (supplied by the customer) on tape, diskette,
or other medium or directly into a data processing system,” and “provision
of data processing services not elsewhere classified.”145 Google and
Facebook provide a variety of different services to their users, or “custom-
ers” in this situation, that fall into these categories. For example, Google
stores the user history of all its users in order to improve search function-
ality for everyone and prioritizes an individual’s search results based on
this history.146 Google also allows customers to create documents and e-
mails online to store on Google’s servers for access anywhere.147
Facebook similarly allows its customers to upload information and data to
share with countless others, processing it into accessible information and
prioritizing friends’ information in a “news feed.”148 Although the com-
puter and related services described above are reminiscent of a time where
data storage and processing required the use of physical data storage units,
this does not prevent Google and Facebook’s modern systems from quali-
fying for protection under the PRC’s commitment schedule. The Appel-
late Body’s decision in U.S.—Gambling recognized the electronic delivery
of a service falls into that service’s category, based on the “technological
neutrality” principle.149 Additionally, while some of these standards refer
to tapes and diskette, they clearly leave room for future technological up-
grades by specifying “or other medium” and recognizing the importance of
electronic data storage.150
Having established that several of Google and Facebook’s services
qualify as computer and related services, the PRC’s commitments regard-
ing these categories can be evaluated. The results are much more straight-
forward than under the value-added telecommunications services category
as the PRC has committed to impose no limitations on both market access
and national treatment in the area of computer and related services.151
The PRC appears to be in violation of these obligations as it has prevented
Google and Facebook from providing their services in mainland China in
143. PRC Concession Schedule, supra note 95. R
144. Id. at 10.
145. Central Product Classification, supra note 96, at 247. R
146. See Technology Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/corporate/com
pany/tech.html (last visited July 21, 2013).
147. Id.
148. News Feed Basics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=408 (last vis-
ited July 21, 2013).
149. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶ 180. R
150. Central Product Classification, supra note 96, at 247. R
151. PRC Concession Schedule, supra note 95, at 10. R
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almost any form.152 Blocking Google China’s search functionality stopped
it from acquiring information from its mainland Chinese users, and the
intermittent blocking of GMail and document services indicate that the
PRC government has broken its promise to allow providers of those ser-
vices access into the country under similar conditions as domestic competi-
tors.153 Similarly, Facebook has been denied any access to the PRC
market, making it impossible for it to gather, index, prioritize, and share
the information of its potential customers.154 Thus, the PRC likely has not
upheld its specific promises embodied in its Commitment Schedule in the
case of Google and Facebook.
C. Application of the Most Favored Nation Principle
Now that the PRC’s obligations regarding its commitment schedule
have been identified, an analysis of another critical GATS provision can
take place. All WTO member countries are parties to the GATS, which in
addition to the voluntary commitments described above, includes a
mandatory provision, MFN.155 The MFN provision was intended to pre-
vent member countries from discriminating between foreign-based ser-
vices if the member had already opted to allow the importation of those
services.156 The MFN principle is codified at Article II of GATS and is
regularly referred to as one of the cornerstones of the WTO.157 As with
the various other WTO commitments, the WTO does allow member coun-
tries to participate in free trade areas, an important exception to most
WTO commitments, including the GATS.158 The GATS does allow for
several exceptions to its articles, but the discussion below will highlight
that their impact on the MFN principle is quite limited.
The MFN requirement of the GATS may be overlooked in arguments
regarding PRC censorship, but it could have an incredibly positive impact
for the United States if it were to file a case on behalf of Google and
Facebook. Google was incorporated in California in September of 1998
and reincorporated in Delaware in October 2002.159 The majority of
Google’s operations continue to take place in the United States, and it is
152. Lau, supra note 19; Wauters, supra note 46. R
153. Lau, supra note 19; Wauters, supra note 46. R
154. Wauters, supra note 46. R
155. GATS, supra note 12, art. II. R
156. See Basic Purpose and Concepts, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/eng
lish/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c1s6p1_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2013).
157. Id.
158. Id. Free trade areas and customs unions grant more favorable treatment to partici-
pating countries than their current WTO obligations. FTAs and the WTO, EUR. FREE TRADE
ASS’N, http://www.efta.int/free-trade/fta-and-wto.aspx (last visited July 21, 2013).
159. Fourth Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Google Inc.,
GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/corporate/certificate-of-incorporation.html (last visited
July 21, 2013); Our History in Depth, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/his-
tory/ (last visited July 21, 2013).
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regularly referred to as a U.S. titan.160 Google’s primary “Chinese” com-
petitors are Baidu and Youku, the former being the dominant provider of
search engine services and the latter providing video streaming services.161
Baidu and Youku benefit from extensive government support and favorit-
ism.162 Both Baidu’s and Youku’s headquarters are located in the People’s
Republic of China’s capital city, Beijing, and are respectively referred to
as the “Chinese Google” and “Chinese YouTube.”163 These titles are actu-
ally misnomers, however, as neither Baidu nor Youku are PRC-incorpo-
rated companies. Both Baidu and Youku are officially Cayman Island-
incorporated entities.164 Facebook’s situation is similar to Google’s as its
only “Chinese” competitor is not as Chinese as one might assume. Renren
may appropriate Facebook’s designs and refer to itself as the “Chinese
Facebook,” but it is also a Cayman Islands-incorporated entity.165
The fact that all of Google’s and Facebook’s PRC-market competitors
are registered abroad raises a novel issue. If these “Chinese” companies
have their headquarters in the PRC but are incorporated abroad, are the
GATS’ MFN principles triggered? In order to maintain consistency within
the WTO and PRC law, the answer to this question must be in the affirma-
tive. The WTO mandates that its dispute settlement mechanisms be gov-
erned by law rather than politics.166 Therefore, in order to determine the
nationality of an entity, its legal status and registration must be the deci-
sive factor. Additionally, if a country is expected to maintain uniform and
objective laws,167 the PRC should be required to rely on legal registration.
When foreign companies attempt to do business in the PRC, they face a
host of regulatory requirements that they must fulfill, including a require-
160. See generally Our History in Depth, supra note 159. R
161. Although Youku’s market-share does not represent a majority, it has partnered
with its only viable competitor, Tudou, to provide content. Chen Limin, Youku Tudou Out-
lines Vision for Merged Company, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 26, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://www
.chinadaily.com.cn./bizchina/2012-09/26/content_15783661.htm.
162. See David Barboza, China’s Internet Giants may be Stuck There, GLOBE & MAIL
(Aug. 23, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://m.theglobeandmail.com/technology/chinas-internet-giants-
may-be-stuck-there/article1374338/?service=mobile (“‘If the Chinese government continues
to favor domestic companies, those companies that reach critical mass could become phe-
nomenally profitable . . . ‘ said Gary Rieschel, founder of Qiming Ventures, a U.S. venture
capital firm with investments in China. ‘But it may be hard for those companies to become
world class without outside competition.’”); see also Frederik Balfour, You Say Guanxi, I say
Schmoozing, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/07_47/b4059066.htm.
163. BIDU Company Profile, supra note 79; RENN Company Profile, supra note 79; R
YOKU Company Profile, supra note 79. R
164. Baidu, Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/sym
bol/bidu (last visited July 21, 2013); Youku Tudou Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data, NAS-
DAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/yoku (last visited July 21, 2013).
165. Renren, Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/sym
bol/renn (last visited July 21, 2013).
166. See Understanding the WTO: A Unique Contribution, supra note 2. R
167. See GATS, supra note 12, arts. II & IV. R
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ment to form joint ventures with local entities in most industries.168 As the
PRC relies upon the registration status of a corporation to judge whether a
corporation is a foreign entity, it should be required to rely on it in this
circumstance as well.169
Assuming that a panel or appellate body would label Baidu, Tudou,
and Renren as foreign entities relative to the PRC, the United States
could easily succeed on a claim that the PRC has failed to uphold its MFN
obligations. The MFN requirement of the GATS requires the PRC to treat
all foreign service importers in the same manner, but that has not been the
case.170 As detailed above, the PRC government has forced the complete
closure of Google China, regularly blocks Google.com, and has intermit-
tently blocked GMail.171 Baidu, however, continues to enjoy full access to
the PRC market even though its practices are no better than Google’s in
censoring pornography,172 dissident material, or copyright-infringing
data.173 Google’s YouTube remains completely unavailable in the PRC,
but Youku and Tudou remain completely accessible even though the latter
is well known for hosting videos that neither they nor their uploaders have
a copyright over.174 Youku and Tudou have also hosted anti-government
and pornographic videos.175 Similar to Google’s story, Facebook’s main
168. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, supra
note 130, art. 1. Jeffrey Hays, Foreign Companies and Foreign Investment in China, FACTS R
AND DETAILS, http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=349 (last visited July 21, 2013)
(“Foreign companies doing business in China are generally required to form joint ventures
with Chinese companies instead of forming wholly owned subsidiaries.”). There is evidence
that the PRC government has become less adamant about foreign companies forming joint
ventures with domestic partners in order to enter the PRC market. Nevertheless, in indus-
tries that are considered “sensitive” or where it would be beneficial for a PRC partner to
acquire industrial knowledge, the PRC government continues to require any foreign entrants
to form a joint venture with a domestic partner. MAARTEN ROOS, CHINESE COMMERCIAL
LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 131 (2010) (“Chinese law continues to restrict foreign investors
from operating wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries. In these industries, the only way for for-
eign investors to legally participate is through a joint venture with a local counterpart. Typical
examples of industries that remain open only to Chinese-foreign joint ventures, as deter-
mined in the Foreign Investment Catalogue, are car manufacturing, life-insurance, finance,
securities, printing telecommunications, and certain mining activities.”).
169. See Offshore Jurisdiction Information, LEHMAN, LEE & XU, http://www.lehmanlaw
.com/resource-centre/faqs/restructuring/corporate-services-practice/offshore-jurisdiction-in
formation.html (last visited July 21, 2013).
170. GATS, supra note 12, art. II. R
171. See Lau, supra note 19. R
172. See Tan, supra note 24 (“Baidu rapped for spreading [Edison Chen] photos”). R
173. Chen, supra note 26 (discussing the Music Copyright Society of China’s complaint, R
which alleged that Baidu “‘stealthily provide[s] unlicensed music streaming and downloading
via its Web site, and thus earn[s] significant advertising revenues via its massive online traffic
brought about by its music download service.’”); see also Thompson, supra note 79. R
174. Nick Puno, Much Ado About Video: Youku Buys Tudou, TECH WIRE ASIA (Mar.
12, 2012), http://www.techwireasia.com/2311/much-ado-about-video-youku-buys-tudou/.
175. China’s Online Video Website Youku in Hot Water for Distributing Child Porn
Videos, WHAT’S ON DALIAN (July 25, 2012), http://www.whatsondalian.com/news-4627-
china-s-online-video-website-youku-in-hot-water-for-distributing-child-porn-videos.html;
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competitor, Renren, is for all intents and purposes a copy of Facebook.176
Their designs and functions are nearly identical, including the “newsfeed,”
“wall,” and other functions, with the PRC government regularly perusing
users’ information and blocking what it deems inappropriate.177 The most
common defense against compliance with the MFN requirements is a free
trade area, but the PRC and Cayman Islands do not have such a
relationship.178
Without explicit justification, the PRC government has blocked
Google and Facebook while their similarly situated competitors continue
to enjoy relatively free reign.179 Google, Baidu, Youku, Facebook, and
Renren are all foreign corporations under WTO principles and PRC law,
so the MFN requirement should logically apply to the situation at hand.
Nevertheless, the PRC has chosen not to treat these foreign competitors
similarly and is, therefore, likely in violation of the MFN principle con-
tained in GATS.
D. Defenses to the Most Favored Nation Clause: Step One
If the United States brought this case, the PRC would have an oppor-
tunity to defend its practices. Article XIV of the GATS states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any Member of Measures: (a) neces-
sary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; The pub-
lic order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental in-
terests of society.180
The exceptions allow a WTO member country to skirt its GATS re-
quirement in order to protect public morality or prevent threats to na-
tional security.181 The PRC government has often claimed the public
morals and public security exceptions in the face of international criticism
Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem), N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html?pagewant
ed=8&ei=5090&en=972002761056363f&ex=1303444800; see also, Jack Phillips, Chinese Cen-
sors Announce Tighter Controls on Online Video Content, EPOCH TIMES (July 13, 2012),
http://m.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/chinese-censors-announce-tighter-controls-on-on
line-video-content-264012.html.
176. See Ong, supra note 113 (“‘The Chinese government blocked every single interna- R
tional Web 2.0 Internet service, and we Chinese copycat every one,’ he said, describing the
country’s strategy as a simple ‘block and clone’ tactic.”); 5 Reasons Why Renren Will Never
be a Facebook Equivalent, SIGNATURE9, http://www.signature9.com/electrotech/5-reasons-
why-renren-will-never-be-a-facebook-equivalent (last visited July 21, 2013).
177. See Ong, supra note 113; 5 Reasons Why Renren Will Never be a Facebook R
Equivalent, supra note 176. R
178. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2013).
179. See generally Ong, supra note 113. R
180. GATS, supra note 12, art. XIV. R
181. Id.
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over its censorship scheme, but the analysis below will illustrate that it is
unlikely to succeed on such a defense.182 The public morality and security
exceptions to the GATS should not be understated, as the China-Audiovi-
sual opinion affirmed the WTO’s commitment to these principles.183 That
said, however, any panel or appellate body is likely to take an extremely
narrow approach to interpreting Article XIV. The footnote to Article XIV
explicitly seeks to limit the ability for member states to invoke the Article,
and the Article’s applicability to this situation is unclear.184
In order to determine whether a country may benefit from the protec-
tions of Article XIV, the WTO determines whether the measures taken
are related to and necessary to achieve an acceptable objective.185 In ex-
amining whether a measure is necessary, WTO panels conduct a weighing
and balancing test.186 Such a test looks at the relative importance of the
interest furthered by the challenged measure, the contribution of the mea-
sure to the realization of the interest, and the impact on international com-
merce.187 Ultimately, these factors indicate whether there are any
reasonable WTO-consistent alternatives available to the challenged mea-
sure.188 As with any affirmative defense, the burden of proof rests with the
party seeking to invoke Article XIV’s protections.189
The PRC government espouses several reasons in support of its cen-
sorship regime. Beyond the general statement that the PRC’s censorship is
meant to protect public morality, the two specific justifications that are
most often mentioned are the desires to inhibit the flow of pornography
and to halt the flow of “false” information that might incite ethnic ten-
sions.190 Additionally, scholars and Western politicians regularly claim
that the entire regime is intended to protect the CCP from negative infor-
mation.191 Before diving into the tests a WTO panel would apply, it is
relatively easy to discard the argument that PRC censorship is necessary
to protect the CCP from negative coverage. Protecting the CCP from un-
flattering information is not related to one of Article XIV’s narrow excep-
tions, which provide that a member state may employ measures to
182. See Computer Information Regulations, supra note 109. R
183. China—Audiovisual Products, supra note 101, ¶¶ 25054. R
184. See GATS, supra note 12, art. XIV. n.5. R
185. Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶ 292. R
186. Id. ¶ 305.
187. Id. ¶ 306. According to the recent Appellate Bodies to deal with issues of this
nature, this list of factors is not exhaustive but no further factors have yet been enumerated.
Id.
188. Id. ¶ 307.
189. Id. ¶ 309. It’s important to note that the burden is not to prove that are no reason-
ably available alternatives, but to show that it engaged in a diligent search for less restrictive
alternatives. See id. ¶¶ 30911.
190. Kenji Minemura, China Bans Reporting on 18 Subjects, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Mar. 26,
2010), http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201003250329.html.
191. See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2011: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 104 (2011).
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maintain public order.192 Importantly, it does not state that a member
country may employ measures to protect the political order.193 It would be
untenable to argue that WTO signers had intended to allow member states
the power to protect a specific political hierarchy or a specific ruling
class.194 Even the PRC’s constitution reflects this distinction perfectly, as
it explicitly allows the government censorship authority to protect the
state’s interests but fails to grant the same power to protect a political
party’s interests.195 As member countries are entitled to protect the public
order but not the political order, it is unlikely that a WTO panel would
allow the PRC to adopt measures on the basis of protecting a political
party.
Preventing the dissemination of pornography could certainly be an ap-
propriate goal under Article XIV.196 Although it is less clear if halting the
spread of information that could lead to ethnic tensions is acceptable, a
WTO panel could defer to the member country invoking such a basis.197
As described above, the first test that the contested measures must meet is
that they be related to the pursuit of a specific goal.198 Assuming that the
censorship regime is intended to prevent the spread of pornography and
violence-inciting information, this test is easy to meet.199 Although it is a
crude tool, blocking Google, YouTube, and Facebook certainly removes
three of the many ways that individuals can access pornography and share
violence-inciting communications. Thus, a WTO panel may agree that the
PRC’s censorship regime is related to its goals of halting pornography and
information that may result in ethnic tensions.
The PRC is unlikely to fare as well when it comes to the “necessary”
test, however. Under this weighing and balancing analysis, the importance
192. See GATS, supra note 12, art. XIV. R
193. See id.
194. Certainly the founding of the WTO was lead largely by developed countries
marked by democratic systems of governance. Press Brief— Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multi-
lateral Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min96_e/chrono.htm (last visited July 21, 2013).
195. XIANFA art. 35–40 (2004) (China).
196. See Jonathan Lynn, Internet Censorship Liable to WTO Challenge— Study,
REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2009, 5:49 PM), http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/businessNews/
idINIndia-43677220091104; Main Building Blocks: Agreement, Annexes, and Schedules,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c2s6p1_e
.htm (last visited July 21, 2013) (“As noted before, the Agreement clearly distinguishes be-
tween, on the one hand, trade liberalization under specific commitments and, on the other
hand, domestic regulation for quality and other legitimate policy purposes. By the same to-
ken, there is no need to schedule access restrictions, such as sales bans on arms or porno-
graphic material and the like, that fall under the General Exceptions of Article XIV or
prudential measures aimed to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial services
sector.”).
197. The WTO remains conscious of individual member’s sovereignty. See Top 10 Rea-
sons to Oppose the World Trade Organization? Criticism, yes . . . misinformation, no!, supra
note 126. R
198. Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶ 292. R
199. See generally id. ¶¶ 254–330.
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of the end goal, the contribution of the measure to achieving it, and the
impact on international commerce are examined.200 Halting the spread of
pornography is likely to be considered an important goal.201 Preventing
ethnic strife is also an important desire, but the fact that it may involve
silencing communication of truthful information certainly weighs against it
to some degree.
As for the second prong, it is hard to show that blocking Google and
Facebook has had any meaningful impact on the battle against pornogra-
phy202 and ethnic strife.203 Tens of thousands of pornographic websites
remained accessible within the PRC204 and the most direct competitors to
Google and Facebook in the PRC appear to have facilitated it.205 Ethnic
tensions remain extremely dangerous within the PRC.206 The measures
have also dammed the flow of international commerce to an incredible
degree. In the U.S.—Gambling case, the ultimate effect on trade was only
estimated to be about $21 million.207 In this instance, the impact on the
U.S. economy is likely to be in the billions.208
The ultimate purpose of the weighing and balancing test is to examine
whether there are any reasonably available alternatives to the contested
measure that have a less detrimental impact on trade.209 In this, the PRC’s
measures are likely to fail for several reasons. First, it’s clear that the rea-
sons the PRC has given for blocking Google and Facebook may be just a
pretext.210 Many have accused the PRC of blocking these U.S. titans sim-
ply to aid their competitors.211 A WTO panel would have to undergo a
lengthy analysis of the available evidence in this matter. The evidence is
more straightforward when it comes to the alternative measures that the
200. Id. ¶¶ 254–306.
201. See Lynn, supra note 196. R
202. See China Shuts Over 60,000 Porn Websites This Year, supra note 27. R
203. See Didi Tang, Anti-Japan Protests in China Swell, Turn Violent, YAHOO! NEWS
(Sept. 15, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/anti-japan-protests-china-swell-turn-violent-
044101740.html.
204. See China Shuts Over 60,000 Porn Websites This Year, supra note 27; Tan, supra R
note 24. R
205. Thompson, supra note 79; Tan, supra note 24; China’s Online Video Website Youku R
in Hot Water for Distributing Child Porn Videos, supra note 175. R
206. Tang, supra note 203. R
207. Dispute Settlement: United States, supra note 115. R
208. China’s Censorship of the Internet and Social Media: The Human Toll and Trade
Impact Before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 112th Cong. 15 (2011)
(statement of Gilbert B. Kaplan, President, Committee to Support U.S. Trade Laws).
209. Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶ 307. R
210. See Ong, supra note 113. R
211. See, e.g., Peter Scheer, China’s Great Firewall Impedes Foreign Trade, SFGATE
(Jan. 24, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/China-s-Great-Firewall-im-
pedes-foreign-trade-3202538.php (“The United States can argue that China’s ‘Great Fire-
wall’—a system of filters and bottlenecks that effectively shutters the country within its own
intranet—is an illegal restraint on international trade because it bars foreign companies from
competing, via the Internet, in the vast Chinese market.”).
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PRC can rely upon. The PRC government has proven so adept at blocking
material by itself that it can simply block references or certain information
from appearing on Google or Facebook rather than blocking those ser-
vices as a whole.212 As detailed previously, the only way Internet compa-
nies in the PRC actually know what material should be blocked is by
attempting to access it themselves and seeing what makes it through and
what does not.213 Therefore, there is no need to censor Google and
Facebook themselves. Removing the restrictions on access to Google and
Facebook would limit access to the same number of pornographic and vio-
lence-inciting websites as is currently the case while allowing U.S. compa-
nies to operate in the PRC. The fact that such an obvious alternative has
not been utilized also illustrates that the PRC government likely did not
engage in a search for reasonable alternatives. Therefore, a WTO panel is
likely to view the censorship of Google and Facebook as unnecessary to
uphold public morals and order.
E. Defenses to the Most Favored Nation Clause: Step Two
In the final analysis of whether the PRC may claim an exception to its
GATS requirements, the PRC would likely be unsuccessful in defending
its practices. The GATS’ “chapeau” finds its source in the very first section
of Article XIV: “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjus-
tifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on trade in services . . . .”214
The chapeau clause received quite some attention in the U.S.—Gam-
bling case, and it serves as a powerful tool in preventing member countries
from abusing the Article XIV exceptions.215 Quite simply, the chapeau
applies when a member country has used the exceptions as a pretext to
unjustifiably discriminate between countries, and when more reasonable
or less trade distorting alternatives were available in achieving the claimed
goal.216
As it is intended to do, the chapeau would step into this situation and
likely invalidate the PRC’s practices if it had succeeded thus far in defend-
ing its practices under Article XIV. First, the evidence suggests that the
PRC government has attempted to use the Article XIV exceptions as pre-
text to discriminate against America’s Internet titans while allowing Baidu
212. See Thompson, supra note 79. R
213. See id.
214. GATS, supra note 12, art. XIV.
215. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 97. The chapeau clause of Article XX of R
the GATT was also analyzed in Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres (Bra-
zil—Tyres). Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres,
¶¶ 27–43, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). Although there are differences in the texts of the
provisions, Article XX and Article XIV are treated similarly by WTO panels. Appellate
Body Report, supra note 97, ¶ 291. R
216. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 97. R
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and Youku free reign in the PRC market.217 Baidu and Youku are, in fact,
no less effective at blocking the material the PRC government wishes it
to.218 Most telling, however, is the fact that the PRC possesses tools and
alternatives that would not distort billions of dollars in trade.219 As the
PRC government already censors Internet activity, it already possesses the
most efficient and thorough tools.220 As such, there is no need to cause a
trade distortion by censoring Google, YouTube, and Facebook. Further-
more, if a member country wishes to block material due to its immoral
nature or other threat to society, logically, the member country would
block that type of material coming in from any other country. In contrast,
if the member country claims to block material from one country on the
grounds that it is objectionable but allows the importation of the same
material from another country, the material has not been objectionable
enough to be considered a threat to public morals or public order.
IV. APPLICATION OF TRIPS TO THE PRC CENSORSHIP REGIME
Although this topic remains largely unexplored in the current contro-
versy, TRIPS could serve as a powerful tool for the U.S. government in
challenging the PRC’s censorship of Google and Facebook. TRIPS applies
to all WTO members.221 Among its most important features, it sets mini-
mum standards for the protection of intellectual property among member
countries and mandates that every country have venues whereby intellec-
tual property rights holders can challenge infringing parties.222 A U.S. ar-
gument relying on TRIPS could proceed on two grounds that will be
discussed below.223 First, the PRC government itself has been involved in
the theft of Google’s intellectual property rights.224 Second, rather than
create a system whereby intellectual property rights are enforced, the
PRC’s policies actually encourage the infringement of copyrights.
217. Steven Seidenberg, Breaking China, ABA J. MAG. (Nov. 1, 2010, 3:10 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/breaking_china/; see also Scheer, supra note 211. R
218. See China Shuts Over 60,000 Porn Websites This Year, supra note 27. R
219. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 79. R
220. See id.
221. See Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2013).
222. Id.
223. Facebook might also be able to make an argument that it is not receiving national
treatment as its intellectual property is being used by Renren, but Facebook would likely
have to make a case in the PRC courts first to make an argument in front of the WTO.
Additionally, such an argument would likely follow the reasoning laid out above.
224. Lanxiang Vocational School, a government-run military school has now been
traced as the source for a variety of hacking events, including those discovered by State
Department officials in February 2010. School Linked to Operation Aurora is Tied Indirectly
to Hacktivist Group, INFOSECURITY (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/
view/7486/school-linked-to-operation-aurora-attack-is-tied-indirectly-to-hacktivist-group/
[hereinafter Operation Aurora].
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Article XLIV of TRIPS requires WTO member countries to establish
procedures that enforce the protection of intellectual property rights.225
There have been a variety of instances where hackers have infiltrated
Google from abroad, but Operation Aurora marked a new chapter. In Op-
eration Aurora, a PRC-funded government program not only infiltrated
Google’s user accounts, but it also resulted in the theft of some of
Google’s source code. The PRC government continues to deny responsi-
bility, but nearly all of the attacks were traced to a military school, and the
disclosures by WikiLeaks have revealed that a member of the PRC’s
Politburo ordered the attack.226 While Google’s executives have declined
to comment specifically on which pieces of intellectual property were sto-
len, the issue was considered serious enough to warrant a public statement
by the company. Although most of the WTO’s obligations focus on the
sort of regulations and treatment a member country’s government must
provide for private commerce, some requirements must logically relate to
the government’s own behavior. In this instance, if the government itself is
involved in a breach of intellectual property rights, it ordinarily cannot be
the case that the government has fulfilled its obligations to protect intel-
lectual property rights. Instead, the PRC has likely gone beyond what
TRIPS attempted to prescribe by actually participating in the violation of
intellectual property protections.
The U.S. government also made a powerful argument in regards to the
PRC’s audiovisual importation restrictions. Although the China—Audio-
visual case was decided largely on the application of GATS, the United
States stated that imposing restrictions on the amount of copyrighted ma-
terial that may enter the PRC only serves to create an underground black
market for those materials.227 For example, limiting the number of foreign
films that were allowed to be released in the PRC market only led con-
sumers to purchase pirated versions of those movies.228 The result in the
Google/Facebook case has been similar. As Facebook remained blocked in
the PRC, Renren simply took its place by copying Facebook’s interface,
tools, and functionality exactly even though this had been copyrighted by
Facebook.229 In blocking Google, the PRC government has pushed traffic
both to Baidu and Youku, both of which are well known for disregarding
copyright laws.230 Baidu itself allows users to download copyrighted music
and Youku streams copyrighted videos without acquiring the necessary the
rights. Together, this is a harder TRIPS argument to make, but one that
225. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 44. R
226. Shane & Lehran, supra note 30; Leigh, supra note 30. “[T]he hacker attacks which R
forced Google to quit China in January were orchestrated by a senior member of the
Politburo who typed his own name into the global version of the search engine and found
articles criticizing him personally.” Leigh, supra note 30; see Operation Aurora, supra note R
224. R
227. See generally China—Audiovisual Products, supra note 101. R
228. Id. ¶¶ 70, 76.
229. See, e.g., Darwell, supra note 177. R
230. Jacob, supra note 26. R
34040-m
il_34-4 Sheet No. 112 Side B      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 112 Side B      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL404.txt unknown Seq: 34 10-OCT-13 10:02
890 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 34:857
might be worthy of U.S. attention. After all, how can the PRC be protect-
ing intellectual property rights when it is causing their theft or, at a mini-
mum, taking a complicit role in allowing their theft? While many policies
lead to unintended consequences, the results here are foreseeable and due
to an irrational policy.231
V. ENFORCEMENT
As any U.S. lawyer might ask, “what good is a right without a rem-
edy?” While the preceding Parts have focused on the legal arguments
against the PRC’s censorship regime, changing the status quo would come
with great difficulty. Due to a combination of real world politics and WTO
law, any remedies the United States would be awarded might benefit the
United States economically but not affect the current censorship regime.
The analysis below provides a guide for how the dispute mechanism would
likely deal with the issue of remedies.
If the United States were to win, the PRC government, after entering
into settlement negotiations, would have to choose between whether to
conform, provide compensation, or suffer retaliation. As an initial matter,
it seems unlikely that the PRC would refrain from censoring Google or
YouTube. Even after immense pressure from nearly all of the Western
world, it has continued to hold steady. Indeed, the issue has become of
such prominence that the PRC government may have become entrenched
in its position, especially given Chinese culture’s emphasis on not losing
face.232 If the PRC does not comply with the ruling, it could choose to pay
compensation in the amount that Google and Facebook suffer due to the
PRC’s WTO violations.233 This option would benefit both the PRC as its
government gets to maintain its regime and helps the United States re-
cover the economic harms suffered by Google and Facebook.
Ultimately, however, the PRC may be unwilling to respond to the
United States’ victory at all. This would put the United States in a difficult
situation due to the WTO laws surrounding the forms of retaliation a
member country may utilize. The relevant provisions suggest that the
United States take action within the same category of services and intel-
lectual property as the violations that have taken place.234 An interesting
231. As described above, none of Facebook and Google’s competitors actually do a
better job at censoring harmful material.
232. The concept of losing face is not unique to China and is a concept recognized in
most Asian countries. Although there are several facets to the concept, among the most
important are avoiding embarrassment and not admitting wrongfulness. See generally Greg
Rodgers, The Concept of Saving Face, ABOUT, http://goasia.about.com/od/Customs-and-Tra-
ditions/a/Saving-Face.htm (last visited July 21, 2013).
233. DSU, supra note 16, art. 22, cl. 2. R
234. Id. art. 22, cl. 3; The Process—Stages in a typical WTO dispute settlement case,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6
s10p1_e.htm (“Regarding the type of obligations to be suspended, the DSU imposes certain
requirements. In principle, the sanctions should be imposed in the same sector as that in
which the violation or other nullification or impairment was found (Article 22.3(a) of the
DSU).”).
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response to this would be to block PRC Internet service providers or their
stock listings in the United States, but the analysis above has shown that
this would actually be a retaliation against the Cayman Islands rather than
the PRC. As the Cayman Islands are not parties to the WTO, however, it
is not impossible for the United States to pursue such a route. Yet, block-
ing “PRC” Internet services is unlikely to serve much use as none of them
have the stature or revenue in the United States as Google and Facebook
would have in the PRC absent the censorship regime.
The inability to sanction PRC service providers would lead to a preca-
rious situation, as the United States is most likely to benefit from retali-
ating against goods manufactured in the PRC, which represents a large
portion of U.S. imports. Utilizing previous WTO arbitration decisions as a
guide, members who seek to retaliate in a sector different from the one
that was the subject of the dispute must overcome a significant burden.
Such a country must prove that imposing sanctions under the same sector
of trade would either not be practicable or would not total an amount
equal to the damages it is entitled to.235 Additionally, it would have to
prove that the circumstances are serious enough to seek suspension under
another agreement.236 While these are major obstacles to overcome, it is
likely that the United States would satisfy the requirements. As detailed
above, the amount of trade being impacted here is in the billions of dollars
and, therefore, a serious circumstance. Additionally, the lack of services
and intellectual property that flow from the PRC into the United States
likely requires utilizing a separate agreement. Indeed, the vast majority of
PRC exports to the United States come in the form of manufactured
goods and the United States should have no trouble imposing measures
upon those imports that amount to the damages the censorship regime has
inflicted as the trade deficit in goods between the two countries alone is
enough.
CONCLUSION
In this information age we live in, the U.S. economy will become more
dependent on its Internet pioneers for economic growth. As such, Google
and Facebook are important companies for the future of the United
States. The United States faces a difficult task ahead of it in challenging
the PRC for what may traditionally have been referred to as a “domestic
policy” of censorship. The WTO is the best venue for such a battle and its
primary obligations, including the GATS and TRIPS, should enable the
United States to claim victory against the PRC’s discrimination against
Google and Facebook for several reasons. First, the censorship of Google
and Facebook appears to contradict the PRC’s own concession schedule,
which is made binding through the GATS. Second, blocking Google and
235. See Arbitration Decision, European Communities—Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities
Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶¶ 69–86, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
236. Id.
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Facebook in mainland China while allowing Baidu, Tudou, and Renren is
likely a violation of the MFN principle. Lastly, allowing or sponsoring the
theft of intellectual property from U.S. Internet titans goes against TRIPS,
which requires members of the WTO to protect intellectual property
rights.
